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Abstract. As wireless sensor networks grow, so does the need for effective secu-
rity mechanisms. We propose a cryptographic key-management protocol, called
energy-efficient key-management (EEKM) protocol. Using a location-based group
key scheme, the protocol supports the revocation of compromised nodes and energy-
efficient rekeying. The design is motivated by the observation that unicast-based
rekeying does not meet the security requirements of periodic rekeying in long-lived
wireless sensor networks. EEKM supports broadcast-based rekeying for low-energy
key management and high resilience. In addition, to match the increasing com-
plexity of encryption keys, the protocol uses a dynamic composition key scheme.
EEKM also provides group-management protocols for secure group communication.
We analyzed the energy efficiency and security of EEKM and compared it to other
key-management protocols using a network simulator.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The architecture and design of sensor networks and hardware have progressed sig-
nificantly in the past few years [8, 9, 10]. Sensor nodes (SNs) are small and have
wireless communication capability within short distances. An SN typically contains
a wireless transmitter/receiver, and power, sensing, processing, and storage units.
A wireless sensor network is comprised of a large number of SNs with limited power,
computation, storage, and communication capability.
Here we propose an energy-efficient key-management protocol (EEKM) for large-
scale WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks) that supports a lightweight rekeying me-
chanism while providing security properties similar to those of pairwise key-sharing
schemes [11]. Existing key-management protocols focus mainly on the efficiency of
distributing keys and key materials to SNs prior to deployment. EEKM does the
same, but also introduces an energy-efficient way to improve scalability, rekeying,
and resilience. We investigated a regional group-oriented rekeying strategy and
designed merge/split protocols based on this rekeying strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
an overview of the proposed protocol’s architecture and assumptions. In Section 3,
we describe the protocol in detail. In Section 4, we evaluate the protocol. The
evaluation includes an analysis of the protocol’s energy efficiency compared to other
key-management protocols and a simulated prototype implementation of a sensor
network test bed. Finally, in Section 5, we present our conclusions and recommen-
dations for future work.
2 SENSOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
In this paper, we use the sensor network model proposed by LEAP [1] and assume
a static sensor network with immobile SNs. The base station (BS) acts as the
key server that is assumed to be a laptop-class device with unlimited power. The
sensor network consists of a large number of SNs distributed throughout the area of
interest. The BS can broadcast a message to all SNs. Each node belongs to its own
virtual group (VG) before being randomly scattered throughout the field of interest
(Figure 1). After deployment, the sensor network is divided into four square regional
groups. Each SN can determine its location during the bootstrap, using a Global
Positioning System (GPS).
We assumed that an adversary could eavesdrop on all traffic, inject packets,
and/or replay old messages. If a node were compromised, all of its information
would be available to the attacker. However, the BS could not be compromised.
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Fig. 2. Patterns of regional groups
Sometimes it is necessary to revoke SNs from a secure network due to node
compromise. Therefore, we assumed that there were mechanisms in place to identify
compromised SNs [2, 3, 4], and revoke them.
3 ENERGY-EFFICIENT KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
Table 1 shows the notation used in the EEKM protocol descriptions. To minimize
power requirements, we use a MAC pseudo-random function (F ) to derive the keys,
implemented as K ′ = F (K, x) = MAC(K, x). SNs are preloaded with an IK, from
which further keys can be established.
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Notation Description
BS Base station of a sensor network
SEQ(A) Message sequence number of A
Si Identifier for node i
V Gi Identifier for virtual group i
RGi Identifier for regional group i
RV Gij Identifier for virtual group j in regional group i
N Random nonce value
KSiBS Individual key shared by BS and node i
MK Master secret key for deriving individual node keys
KAB Secret key shared by A and B (KAB = KBA)
IK Initial master key for deriving new keys
IKM Keying material for generating new IK
CK Common group key shared by nodes and BS
AK Authentication key for message verification
V Ki Secret MAC key shared with virtual group i
RKi Secret MAC key shared with regional group i
RKM Keying material for generating new RK
RVKij Secret MAC key shared with V Gj in RGi
E(K, . . .) Symmetric encryption function using key K
‖ Concatenation operator
MBK Material key for deriving KMB
LOW (KMB[i]) Low-order half part of KMB[i]
HI(KMB[i]) High-order half part of KMB[i]
Table 1. Notation used in security protocols and cryptographic operations
3.1 Dynamic Key Composition with Key Material Box (KMB)
The KMB is generated using the pseudo-random function F, and its size can be
adjusted to the memory resources of an SN. The larger the size, the more complex the
key composition. There is a trade-off between KMB memory and the complexity of
the dynamic key. However, if the node memory is limited and cannot store the KMB,
it can compute KMB elements on the fly. The computation cost is constant and
does not depend on KMB size (sz ). KMB is as follows: KMB[i] = F (MBK, i), {i |
1 ≤ i ≤ sz and i ∈ N}.
3.2 Key Distribution
EEKM key distribution consists of three phases: initialization, group key setup, and
pairwise key setup. We use a temporary-master-key approach [1] to generate group
and pairwise keys.
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3.2.1 Initialization Phase
We use a secret-key mechanism, and each SN stores six keys (KSiBS, IK, AK
′, CK,
VK, and MBK ) in the initialization phase. Every node has an individual key that is
only shared with the BS. This key is generated and preloaded into each node prior
to its deployment. The individual key KSiBS for node Si (each node has a unique
identification) is generated as follows: KSiBS = F (MK,Si), where F is the pseudo-
random function and MK is a master key known only to the BS. When it needs to
communicate with an individual node Si, it computes KSiBS on the fly.
We refer to F (AK, 0) as the verification key AK ′, which is stored in each node.
The equation AK ′ = F (AK, 0) enables a node to verify the authenticity of a message
with AK, a random number. The network-wise key (CK) is used to secure the
broadcast messages to all of the SNs. The BS generates an IK and then loads it
into each node. CK is generated as follows: CK = F (IK, 0). This is a network-wise
key used for broadcasting messages to the entire network.
The virtual group key VK is for randomly classified nodes. Figure 1 shows
the randomly distributed nodes of each VG. Each node is classified into an equal
number of VGs, and has its own virtual group identifier (VGi). VK is generated
as follows: VKi = F (IK,VGi). MBK is generated with F (IK, 1) and is used to
create the KMB (see Section 3.1). The dynamic composition key (DCK) contains
the elements of the KMB selected by the key composition function (KCF), which
uses unique message identification (UMI) as a parameter. UMIs are unique in the
lifetime of the WSN and consist of three components: the UID (Unique ID: BS
or Si), message sequence number (MSN; SEQ[BS] or SEQ[Si]) and material key.
The KCF makes up the dynamic secret key with the UMI. The prototype of RGF
is Key KCF(UID, MSN, K).
The group identification (GID) can be a common group VGi or RGi. Node A
sends group G an encrypted message with KCF and GK, as follows. This phase is
preformed before deployment.
A → G : A||SEQ(A), GID,E(KCF (A, SEQ(A), GKGID), message||N)
3.2.2 Group Key-Setup Phase
The key-setup phase, performed after deployment stores eight keys in each SN
(KSiBS, IK, AK
′, CK, RK, VK, RVK, and MBK ). The SNs of a group share
a common location-based group key. The RG identifier is created by using the
ID-Generating Function for the Regional Group (RGF). The prototype of RGF is
Id RGF(IK, location, pattern , size, center).
The regional group key RK is for regionally classified nodes. Figure 1 shows
four regional groups. All nodes are regionally divided into RGs. Each node has its
regional group identifier RGi, and RK is generated as follows: RKi = F (IK,RGi).
These patterns are used to effectively isolate compromised nodes and generate an
appropriate rekeying message for uninfected groups.
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RVG is generated with VG and RG. Each VG in an RG has a unique subgroup
ID in the WSN. RVGij is the subgroup that belongs to RGi and VGj ; it is different
from RVGji. The number of RVG is |RG| ∗ |VG|, where |x| is the number in group x.
In Figure 1, the number of RVG is 16. RVG, which improves resilience by dividing
nodes into small subgroups, is generated as follows: RVGij = F (IK,RGi||V Gj).
RVK is created with IK and RVG. It is a subgroup key for RVG and is generated
as follows: RVKij = F (IK,RVGij).
3.2.3 Pairwise Key-Setup Phase
Node A computes its pairwise key with B, KAB, as KAB = F (KB, A) and KB =
F (IK, B). Node B computes KBA in the same way. KAB serves as their pairwise
key after deployment. These steps and neighbor-discovery steps are accomplished
simultaneously.
Pairwise key-setup is executed as follows:
A → the neighbor nodes of A(broadcast) :A
B → A :B,MAC(KAB, A||B).
When two neighbor nodes, A and B, are added at the same time, the above
scheme can be simplified. If A receives B ’s response to its message before responding
to B ’s message, A will omit its own response. They will have two different pairwise
keys, KAB and KBA. If A < B, they can choose KAB as their pairwise key. All
nodes erase IK at the end of the pairwise key-setup phase.
3.3 Addition and Deletion of Nodes
Before deployment, the new nodes complete an initialization phase and have N 1
and N 2′ = F (N 2, 0) in the pairwise key-setup phase. N 1 and N 2 are nonce used for
mutual authentication during pairwise key setup. After deployment, they perform
a group key setup and another pairwise key setup.
The pairwise key-setup steps for new nodes are executed as follows:
BS → the existing nodes :BS||SEQ(BS),
E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), CK), F (N 1, 0)||N 2||N)
new node A → neighbor nodes :A,N 1.
If neighbor nodes are the existing nodes, the pairwise key-setup phase is written as
follows:
existing neighbor node B → the new node A :B,N 2
new node A → the existing neighbor node B :A||SEQ(A),
E(KCF (A, SEQ(A), KB), KA||N).
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If neighbor nodes are new nodes, the pairwise key-setup phase is identical to the
initial pairwise key-setup phase:
The existing neighbor node B → the new node A : B,MAC(KAB, A||B).
After this step, the IK of new nodes is erased and pairwise keys are established in
all nodes.
Key revocation refers to the task of securely removing keys which are known to
be compromised. Existing key revocation schemes can be divided into two categories:
centralized key revocation scheme [12, 1] and distributed key revocation scheme [13,
14]. In a centralized key revocation scheme, a centralized authority (BS) is used
to revoke compromised sensors [12, 1]. In a distributed key revocation scheme, no
centralized authority is used and a vote is cast and collected among sensor nodes. If
the vote tally against a sensor node exceeds a specified threshold, the sensor node will
be revoked [13, 14]. EEKM belongs to the centralized key revocation scheme. This
paper focuses on the centralized key revocation scheme. We compare the centralized
revocation schemes proposed in [13], LEAP, and EEKM in Section 4.
It is important to securely update group keys when a compromised node is de-
tected. The group keys must be changed and distributed to all the remaining nodes
in a secure, reliable, and timely fashion. This is referred to as group rekeying. The
BS broadcasts the revocation message to all nodes. CNODE stands for a compro-
mised node and {CNODE1||CNODE2|| . . .} is the set of compromised nodes.
BS → all nodes (broadcast) :BS||SEQ(BS), AKi, F (AKi+1, 0),
E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), CK),
{CNODE1||CNODE2|| . . .}||N)
All nodes authenticate the revocation message with AKi and AK ′i = F (AKi, 0).
This message includes the verification key AK ′i+1 = F (AKi+1, 0) for authentication
of the next message. All nodes verify the authenticity of the revocation message
and then eliminate compromised nodes from the neighbor node list of each SN.
BS → all nodes (broadcast) :BS||SEQ(BS), AKi+1, F (AKi+2, 0),
{RGa, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RKa), IK
i+1||N)||
RGb, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RKb), IK
i+1||N)|| . . .}
The above group rekey message is used to update the IK of all regional groups
except for compromised regional groups. All nodes authenticate this message with
AKi+1 and save N i+2′ = F (AKi+2, 0) for the next authentication.
If some nodes in RVGcc are compromised, non-compromised RGV s except for
RVGcc receive the new IK. The IK update message for the compromised region
RGc is as follows:
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BS → all nodes (broadcast) :BS||SEQ(BS), AKi+2, F (AKi+3, 0),
{RVGca, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RVGca), IK
i+1||
N)||RVGcb, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RVGcb),
IKi+1||N)|| . . .}.
All RVGs in RGc receive a new IK, except for RVGcc. The other nodes only
save F (AKi+3, 0). C, the non-compromised neighbor node of D, does not belong to
RVGcc and has the new IK
i+1. The node D can get the new IKi+1 from the node C
as follows:
D → C :D,MAC(KCD, C||D||N)
C → D :C, SEQ(C), E(KCF (C, SEQ(C), KCD), IK
i+1||N).
3.4 Key Update
In short-lived networks, the threat can be ignored [5]. For other networks, however,
it is necessary to renew the encryption keys occasionally [6].
The rekeying protocol updates the IK, and all nodes regenerate each derived
key, except for the secret key KSiBS shared between the BS and each sensor node.
The following message is broadcast to send a new IK.
BS → all nodes (broadcast) :BS||SEQ(BS), AKi, F (AKi+1, 0),
E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), CK), IKM ||N)
The new IKi+1 is generated by KCF(SEQ(BS), IKi, IKM). After this broadcast,
every derived key generated by IKi is regenerated with the new IKi+1. To maintain
the modified organization of the groups, RG and RVG are not modified. RK and
RVK do not use the previous equations, but the following equations:
RKi+1 = F (IKi+1, RKi),RVKi+1ij = F (IK
i+1,RVKiij).
The regional group key update is carried out as follows:
BS → all nodes (broadcast) :BS||SEQ(BS), AKi, F (AKi+1, 0),
{RGa, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RGa), RKM ||N)||
RGb, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RGb), RKM ||N)|| . . .}.
The new RKi+1 is generated byKCF (SEQ(BS), RKi, RKM). The node belonging
to RGa or RGb updates its RK
i with the new RKi+1. The new RVKi+1 is generated
by F (RKM,RVKi). This message updates RK only and does not affect the other
keys.
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3.5 Group Management: Merging&Splitting
The merge message is sent to groups to integrate them into one group. This message
leads to effective group communication.
BS → all nodes (broadcast) :BS||SEQ(BS), AKi, F (AKi+1, 0),
{RGa, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RGa), RKM ||N)
||RGb, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RGb), RKM ||N)
|| . . .}
RGi+1 is generated by RGF(RKM, 0, 0, 0, 0), and RKi+1 is generated by F(RKM,
RGi+1). Nodes belonging to the target group have the same RKi+1. RVG and RVK
do not use the previous equations, but the following equations:
RVGi+1ij = F (RKM,RG
i+1
i ||V Gj), RVK
i+1
ij = F (RKM,RVG
i+1
ij ).
The split message is sent to the groups for dividing into proper groups. This
message is useful for restricting the effect of a compromised node on the immediate
network neighborhood.
BS → all nodes (broadcast) :BS||SEQ(BS), AKi, F (AKi+1, 0),
{RGa, E(KCF (BS, SEQ(BS), RGa),
RKM ||pattern||size||cp||N)|| . . .}
The new RGi+1 is generated by the RGF(RKM, ldata, pattern, size, cp), the new
RKi+1 is generated by F (RKM,RGi+1), and RVG and RVK are generated by the
same equations of the merge message. Each node computes its own RGi+1 according
to RGF and the parameters. There are various patterns: grid, circle, diagonal, etc.
These patterns are applicable to each regional groups. Figure 2 illustrates the various
patterns of regional groups.
4 EVALUATION
We simulated EEKM using a network simulator with the random network shown in
Figure 1.
We also assume a simple model where the radio dissipates Pcom = 50 nJ/bit to
run the transmitter or receiver circuitry and Pamp = 100 pJ/bit/m
2 for the transmit
amplifier. We assume the overall distance for transmission to be r, the minimum
receiving power at a node for a given transmission error rate is Preceive, and the power
at a transmission node is Psend. The radio frequency (RF) attenuation model near
the ground is given by Preceive ∝
Psend
rα
where r is the transmission distance and α is
the RF attenuation exponent. Due to multiple paths and other interference effects,
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Fig. 3. The normalized sensor network for measuring the energy cost of each protocol
α typically ranges from 2 to 5 [7]. We assume α to be 2. Thus, to transmit a k -bit
message with distance r, we use two equations: Psend(k, r) = Pcom×k+Pamp×k×r
2,
Preceive(k) = Pcom × k. Using these equations and the random 200-node network
shown in Figure 1, we simulated the transmission of data between every node and
sink node that was located within 50m (at x = 50, y = −50). For our experiments,





EEKM Group and pairwise key 0 9× Preceive(k)
LEAP Group key 8× Psend(k, r) 9× Preceive(k)
Random-key Pairwise key 12× 3× Psend(k, r) 12× 2× Preceive(k)
Table 2. Communication cost for rekeying
We analyzed the communication cost of EEKM compared to LEAP and a ran-
dom graph-based scheme. Table 2 shows the communication costs of rekeying for
the three protocols in the normalized sensor network (see Figure 3). In EEKM, the
BS broadcasts the newly encrypted IK to all nodes. In LEAP, the BS initiates the
process by sending the new group key to each of its children in the spanning tree
using its cluster key for encryption. In the random-key preconfiguration scheme,
rekeying is equivalent to self-revocation of a key by a node. After removing the
expired key, the affected nodes restart the discovery process of shared keys, and
possibly the path-key establishment phase. Figure 4 plots the remaining energy by
using the equations (Table 2) with r = 1 and k = 8192.
Figure 5 shows the average remaining energy of 10 simulation results with each
rekeying protocol. In EEKM, the plot does not change in each simulation, whereas
they change using the other protocols. There is difference between two figures,
because the cost of EEKM rekeying is topology independent.
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Fig. 4. The remaining energy after sending each rekeying message using the equations in
Table 2






































Fig. 5. The average remaining energy of the simulation results after sending each rekeying
message
754 K. Paek, J. Kim, C. Hwang, S. Lee, U. Song
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We designed an energy-efficient key-management (EEKM) protocol for large-scale
distributed sensor networks. EEKM uses a predeployed temporary master key ap-
proach that supports a robust and lightweight method for setting up various derived
keys. A broadcast-based rekeying protocol is suitable for periodic rekeying and long-
lived next-generation WSNs. Our simulation results indicate that EEKM is more
energy-efficient than the other key-management protocols. EEKM provides group-
management protocols for secure group communication. Next-generation sensor
networks will be long-lived, highly dynamic, and quality of service (QoS) support-
able. The attack profile on these networks will be more varied and complex. Our
research is needed on adaptive key management to solve these challenges.
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